Kalevi Mäkinen has broad academic and professional history from the security field. He is holding Ph.D. and master’s degrees in Military Science and Arts. In addition, he has among others, Military Officer’s Certificate, Master of Security and other certificates in the field of crises management (in the EU). He has worked for the Finnish Ministry of Defence, G4S, Finnish National Defence University, and Military Academy. Currently he is working in Kallugroup Oy as a Director, and his current work involves corporate security and policy consultancy including due diligence support and assist to clients with the development and implementation of business continuity plans, security strategies and risk management policies among other things.

Can you envision major wild cards (positive or negative) that may occur in the next 20 years?

Well, the problem here is that I don’t quite agree with the concepts of wild card and weak signals. I approach this issue through risks and threats, which have lot of interfaces between wild cards and weak signals. The content of risks, particularly within the enterprise management concept, includes a description that involves both wild cards and weak signals. Ontologically these concepts cross each others, and different fields examine these concepts with different terms.

Well, could you please explain further how you understand the concepts or what are the immediate differences between the definitions used in the Futures research?

Yes, well what I have actually criticized about the Futures research, particularly in a security seminar I attended this summer, is that security is not defined properly. Security concept has several definitions and researches that have modelled the concept. Usually, the concept is looked through historical aspects before going further future; first historical aspects, then the present day and then future prospects. So, when we talk about security and wild cards and weak signals related to it; I conclude these two into strategic security concept, which includes e.g. unexpectedness. Unexpectedness again means that methodologically the capability and means to be prepared for it on operative level are different type. E.g. what I’m doing at the moment in different organisations, which I analyse and audit and develop training programmes; we prepare for different wild cards, which the organization does not even realise at the moment. Despite that the organization is able to prepare itself for them. This is based on that methodologically there exist different elements of e.g. how crisis should be managed. So, within these questions of wild cards and weak signals we only cover very small percentage of security, which makes me doubt how fruitful it is to consider these concepts that are this narrow.

Basically, the problem here is that where I begin to examine things is individual. So, when we speak about modelling from security through perspective of individual, organisation and region: geographical, global, and begin to examine it this way, it answers to so called “new threats”, and answers better to the definition than traditional security definition. So, what is a weak signal in this context in the future, I think, is our lack of common sense or understanding.

- Lack of understanding in a sense that…?

So, yes, to be more specific, to some extent I prioritise security, but most people don’t consider security as such value. Most people who I ask about security, point out a guard and connect security to a negative aspects. But how I consider risks or threats is that they can also be positive as well as negative, and this always is depending on whose point of view is on the focus. The core issue I see in the future is the question of flow of information. For instance, if we take an example of Finnish security authorities that in public is said to be functioned extremely well. In reality, authorities are very narrow in their outlook, and they feel comfortable in their own lockers and don’t even have dialogue with each other. So, this is traditional security. In organizations there has always been different types chiefs and officers; chief of security, chief of rescue services, industrial safety officer etc. They are all functioning in the same organisation, but they are working on different sides of it and have never interacted with each other. However, the future prospect in my opinion should cover security as a change factor. In other words, security should be seen as one factor to develop an organisation, regardless whether the organisation is the UN, or NATO, or the EU. In this sense, security should be included in the structures and operations models, thus the weak signals would be tackled in a way that the organisation is workable in all conditions. Then security would not be a intrinsic value but it would be written in all functions; in the same way it is part of for example payment system or food industry. When security is a value, it will be included in all aspects of developing the organisation; how are these and these things considered form the security aspect. So, I see this type of thinking a one type of risk and threat, where we classify our thinking too narrowly. Not being able to get out of these mindsets, and practice fair openness for example between the Finnish authorities, it is a weak signal, which can be also seen internationally. E.g. Iraq was not attacked, because they had nuclear weapons; the reason was something else, but security was used a politicized tool there.

One threat is that security continues to be a politicized tool for achieving selfish causes. However, this has happened throughout history. So, the weak signal here is (global) lack of common sense, which means that we utilize concepts and issues in a wrong way, and do not openly co-operate. This also affects tolerance, if we continue to take a individual-centred view on focus; in other words, the acknowledgement of human dignity and equality. Naturally, this has a different significance in different cultures. If we began to discuss banning of burkha in Finland, we are on the wrong track completely, since we would then miss the main point. From the Islamic point of view it has a different meaning, which we may not understand that. However, the problem is that we always seem to consider our own point of view the only right one, and do not understand that people from other cultures are thinking as well and they have their own logic. There are many contradictions between these issues.

So, I see that lack of cooperation or collaboration and through that security part of operational level is very much needed. So the wild card here would be the clash between different groups, which is due to the lack of understanding or will to understand and cooperate with each other, and the weak signals to this potential wild car are seen the above mentioned ways. In this case, the clash could be national revolt. For example in China people begin to rise against the current authorities. The differentiation here is that, although this lack of common sense may be seen as a weak signal, I see it a threat instead.

So, the problem of defining wild cards is that I don’t define or classify things that way. I try approach things from another perspective. I don’t try to tackle threats by defining them or I don’t actually even try to tackle any threats. So, how I would approach this issue that I aim to manage the operational process the e.g. organisation has, and that is why the approach is completely different. I try to make sure the operational culture is secure when some undesired event takes place. This event could be war, running out of oil or electricity, epidemic, or it can be anything that we cannot even imagine. So, at this point I don’t even define all the wild cards but begin to develop and analyse an organisation: the methods, policies and procedures, and look for weak signals from there. These weak signals are then put together in a new way and thus are made to look like a wild card, and then it is possible to interfere in the process that may develop thing towards the wild card. But I don’t begin to define or list wild cards this way. My military training is based on this thinking of first defining the threats and then developing a plan of action, but I use a different angle to approach the wild cards. I start looking for the wild cards from the actions of individuals and organization and by analyzing this I get the idea of the potential weak signals and wild cards. Basically, I aim to develop the organization in a way that despite what ever the wild cards is, the organization is able to function. This type of approach involves crisis management and continuity planning. And because of this approach, I find it impossible for me to give you any wild cards, because to me “wild cards” can be anything.

In brief, I don’t begin to define weak signals or wild cards I start with identifying the values of an individual or organization. Values tell the most about culture, which is the core issue here what I do, as culture is space, time and environment –bonded. The other core issue is mission; what is the mission and vision of the organization, country etc. What the organization aims to be and what does it aims to become.

The other thing is that what could really be defined as a wild card? Is terrorist attack or terrorism a wild card? There isn’t really anything new about the. The weak signal is that we don’t understand that these incidents have happened already several times during the past several hundred years. For example if we consider the 9/11 terrorist attacks; they were already known to be happen and anticipated. Only the exact date and time was missing. The idea that attacking some central business centre in USA is wild card is absurd. They had actually prepared for it, it was recurrent incident locally and globally. So, the terrorist attack was a threat, and the probability of the risk that it will happen was small but it would have had significant consequences. There were small signals that were not understood and thus they were not able to prepare for it and the attack happened. These are weak signals. There were critical mistakes made in the process, and paying more attention to developing the procedures would have been enough to prevent this from happening. So, if this was a wild card, then any terrorist attack, break-up of an oil pipeline, storms and so on could be wild cards. So, my question here is that what is so wild about them? Which one of these we don’t know to exist, so that we could not be prepared for them? Each one these would change the course of events locally and globally. So, to me it seems wild card is just a new term created on the top of old issues.

I see, well, if we go a little further then to more methodological aspects, how would you improve the quality of weak signals or wild cards? Or more broadly, what would you add to the current future research?

Quite. Well, if I return to the conference I attended that concerned future security? What bothered me the most was that security as a concept in the present day was not examined further at all. The focus was on the theory of human security, which is theory beyond thirty years. The conference begun and ended with an attempt to define it, but eventually no further examinations were made. For instance, critical security, strategic security was not dealt with at all, which are both more recent products. So, the more defined terminological aspects concerning individual-based view, different procedures and processes is needed to be set up. There are plenty of researches that defines this that are made in Finland as well as globally, and there are plenty of approaches to examine security also one being what security is in future. However, defining this in the future context does not begin by defining wild cards or weak signals and knowing then what will happen. It begins with the preparedness of an individual to act in a changing environment, and then how organization is preparing itself to changes and reacts to them to make their functions continuous. In this case, for instance the terrorist attack is only a one drop that perhaps may change some practices or policies, but if policies and practices always change through crisis that we are not able to anticipate, I don’t know what the new aspect here is.

On the other hand, what I like about the idea is that we can examine these issues among different scientific fields and approaches. However, I think it would much more important to examine the approaches of how wild cards and weak signals should or could be understood. In addition to this, I would like to see a real, creative discourse between policy makers and scientists. For example in Finland we may develop a new strategy for the future of Finland, but there’s no scientific research behind, it and thus it is a political decision with certain agenda.

So, if we think about the impacts of the wild cards and weak signals or risks and threats, you have picked up here; how do think these issues should be addressed by future research and in which field particularly?

Well, I would say that interdisciplinary in all fields as these issues in my opinion cannot be separated and classified only to one field that could solve them the best. For example, if we consider problems among immigration, which could be avoided by different, functional procedures such as proper immigration policy and its implementation, socialization of the immigrants – the systems needs to be taken care of. Now that the systems do not work, e.g. they cause criminal activity. So, basically this and also the fact that immigrants are not openly received in this society is a weak signal. If you approach this issue through the procedures, the fields that should be involved here concern a very broad-scale. So for example in this case we should find right procedures and processes to create more open society and decrease the lack of understanding within these processes that now are crumbling the system.