Alun Rhydderch has worked for the UK Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre since 2005. He managed projects for the Centre including the International Futures Project (2020 scenarios), World Trade: Possible Futures, and Technology and Innovation Futures, and designed and facilitated scenario workshops to inform the UK National Security Strategy. He led development of the Sigma Scan – 250 future issues and trends relevant to UK public policy (www.sigmascan.org). He is a regular speaker on horizon scanning and scenario planning, and has taught a European Commission course on the subject. He has published guidance on the use of scenario planning in government.

Can you envision major wild cards (positive or negative) that may occur in the next 20 years?
 
At the Horizon Scanning Centre we have done quite a lot of research into possible future trends, impacts and wild cards. They are in searchable form on our website, www.sigmascan.org. If you select [high impact, low likelihood] or [high impact, high controversy] in the Advanced search box) you can find some wild cards that should fit your definition. There are about 20-25 papers – similar to your briefs. The main wild cards are:

• Tsunami

• Volcanic eruption at Las Palmas in Canary Islands

• Solar flare that can bring down a satellite network, GPS, etc.

• Possible collapse of the ice sheets in the Antarctic, leading to sea level rises

• Pandemic – the most common wildcard

• Astrobiology and life beyond earth • Asteroid.
 
 Do these have importance outside the UK?
 
Most of them have relevance outside the UK. The future of London is rather UK-specific, of course. Could Britain withdraw from the EU?  This is not just UK-specific, but EU. Most of them are beyond the UK.
 
 Can you envision major wild cards (positive or negative) that may occur in the next 20 years and are particularly relevant to EU research and/or may dramatically affect the ERA vision?
 
There needs to be a coherent process for horizon scanning and foresight at the EU level and that should incorporate some notion of wild cards. Having a specific wild card research programme would be negative – it would be yet another element of a non-joined-up picture at the EU level. It needs a coherent foresight process of scoping and identifying areas of research based on grand challenges and societal benefits. Within these areas there should be proper discussion about what the wild cards are, as well as what the stronger trends are, etc. I am not saying there is no merit in discrete projects under the framework. But for this material to be used properly in the EU, there needs to be a holistic approach.
 
 What are the weak signals that (if detected) could hint at a growing likelihood (or imminent realization) of the wild cards that you mentioned?
 
• The pandemic one – the signals are growing stronger, so it is easy to see where that is coming from.

• Tsunami, solar flares, ice sheets – there are signals that are getting stronger, like global warming and changing weather patterns.
 
 How did you identify Sigma scan wildcards?
 
Various ways – initially brainstorming activities and workshops with various research groups, in and outside of government, such as Institute for the Future in the US (iftf.org) and the Ipsos MORI Research unit. We developed them starting with a STEEP classification (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political). We then broke these categories down into domains and sub-domains. Within these we examined a range of source material – over 2,000-3,000 documents altogether – and identified which themes were picked up in different places and when they reinforced and/or contradicted each other. We analysed this and arrived at an initial selection of about 200 topics, which we submitted to more groups of people – including on the policy side – to test their relevance. Out of that process we had an original list of 150 Sigma scan issues. We had a separate process for the science and technology issues. We contacted leading people working within science and technology, not just in research, but also at technology level, in business, venture capital, science journalists, etc. We brought them to a series of workshops, gathering their insights on the future, then set up a wiki-environment to get them to post their major developments that they felt were a possibility in their area of expertise. That led to 100 issues being identified and described in the Sigmascan – at time it was actually a separate scan called the Delta scan. Three years ago we combined these two databases. So the science and technology ones have a slightly different origin from the general policy ones. The whole process took a lot of time, meetings and research and, of course, writing! There are now about 250 issues, about a quarter of which underwent a thorough review and refresh process in May 2011 with help from RAND Europe.
 
 Are you aware of current attempts to methodologically scan for wild cards?
 
• There was some interesting work done recently by IIASA in Vienna on Extreme events, and of course there is the current EU-supported work. We are currently working to apply horizon scanning to policy questions, rather than being focused on research. We are always interested in new approaches to scanning, including for wild cards.
 
 What other weak signals could be particularly relevant to future changes that may significantly or unexpectedly affect the key aspects of ERA?If you mentioned more than one wild card or weak signal, can you identify any causal relationships between them?Looking ahead to the future of European research – which of the Wi/We that you mentioned from Sigma scan should be given top priority in the EU research?
 
I see ERA as a way of contributing to broader goals such as prosperity and human development, including (but not limited to) within Europe, rather than as something one should worry about the technical aspects of. Maybe that’s because I’m not an EU academic! I think about the future of the EU more than that of ERA. ERA should contribute to that, by sponsoring excellent research. Regarding the future of the EU, there are lots of strong signals at the moment that should not be ignored, on the political and economic side, and some slightly weaker ones regarding the potential for a less harmonious period of social and industrial relations. New forms and expressions of democracy, or ‘people power’ should be expected, and the EU as an institution will need to define itself in a relevant way within these. When the Framework Programmes (FP) are designed, when they frame the research areas, they should ask researchers – and a wide range of stakeholders – to consider, along with what the probable developments will be in a particular research area, also what the less likely, high impact, developments will be. I don’t think they are doing that enough at the moment. They should be thinking about what the important issues will be at the end of the Programme – in 7 years – not at the beginning of it. There is often a difference!
 
 Do you think at the European level they are thinking in that direction?
 
Some people are moving towards that direction, but some people are not interested in going in that direction. I think there is difference of views. Some people perhaps feel threatened or confused by the foresight thing. You will find this also at the national level – people will try to put foresight or horizon scanning into a separate category – it shouldn’t be. People like to put it in a different box – it makes them feel they are in control of it. There is a lot of status quo and inertia within large institutions and it means that using foresight and horizon scanning activities to bring new insights into policy and research is a hard struggle. We know of a few people who are doing that at the moment – we hope they succeed.
 
 Do you prefer other definitions of wild card and weak signals?If these concepts are ambiguous in your opinion, how could they be more clarified and better defined?
 
You can always debate this. This is not a perfect definition but I have not heard a better one. You can spend a lot of time debating definitions, but when you describe wild cards to someone they do understand. We need to recognise that these are not distinct categories – they are possibilities, and it is difficult to evaluate likelihood. I would argue for a continuum, where on the one side you have a relatively stable trend and on the other side you have wild card events. And when you do horizon scanning you need to take note of the whole spectrum, not just one or the other.
 
 What do you think of our definition of weak signals?
 
The only thing I am uncomfortable about is that I think you are defining weak signals only with regard to wild cards. I think you can have weak signals of other changes in trends or other potential developments. Weak signals can be an indicator – of a wild card, but also other things.
 
 Are there interesting lessons from previous foresight studies that employed the WIWE approach?
 
By definition, these are hard to analyse and rationalise and introduce to policy material. Sometimes we were asked for lists, but the lists are not so helpful. I think wild cards are important from a risk point of view. When we do work with government departments on a risk register, they are interested in wild cards. Occasionally when we develop scenarios we use wild cards and their impacts on a range of scenarios. They are a difficult material to use. It is important to consider them, but to do so carefully. We need to try to persuade researchers and policy makers to always be considering themselves where there are wild cards that exist, and to consider extremes rather than just probable events, even though you cannot attach a quantitative value of probability to them. The fact is that they do happen and we have examples of that. So we should not shut them out of planning and consideration, because they are important.